Star Report: Zambia Compact | May 2020

Institutional Strengthening Activity

Institutional Strengthening Activity

The mere availability of infrastructure does not guarantee that people will connect to the network, properly use and maintain facilities, pay their bills, or manage water and human waste safely to prevent contamination and disease. Nor does it guarantee that utilities and service providers will offer services and billing options that meet the needs and income flows of their customer base. Technical solutions for the provision of water, sanitation, and solid waste management services are not sufficient in isolation; social and institutional approaches are essential to ensure that targeted populations actually benefit from infrastructure investments.

In Lusaka’s peri-urban areas, where 47.2 percent of households live in extreme poverty, 56 there was a significant risk that low-income populations would not connect or be able to afford water and sewer services. And yet, expanding water and sewer coverage to peri-urban populations was critical to securing the health benefits of the compact. The affordability of the water and sanitation services was thus a significant risk to the sustainability of MCC’s investments. Furthermore, the infrastructure that delivers water and sanitation services must remain in good working condition in order to continue delivering expected benefits. As noted above, the water utility (LWSC) is responsible for delivering water and sewer services in Lusaka and nearby cities, while the city council (LCC) is responsible for delivering drainage services in Lusaka. They own the respective infrastructure that was upgraded and rehabilitated through MCC’s compact investments, and the responsibility of operating and maintaining these networks falls to them.

To mitigate risks associated with the affordability of services for the population, as well as the challenges of operations and maintenance of water, sanitation and drainage infrastructure, the compact invested in improving the institutional capacity of LWSC and LCC. The Institutional Strengthening Activity funded technical assistance to improve asset management, strategic planning, environmental management and maintenance. It supported both LWSC and LCC in developing policies and structures to provide appropriate, affordable, and sustainable services to poor and underserved populations. It also sought to help LWSC and LCC promote behavior change to encourage connections, service uptake, and custodianship of the infrastructure throughout the city (prevention of vandalism, water theft, illegal dumping, etc.). The Institutional Strengthening Activity included support for the design and implementation of IEC and sanitation marketing campaigns and provided capacity building for LWSC and LCC to continue messaging to residents who benefit from (and pay for) their services. Finally, the Institutional Strengthening Activity included a $6 million grant program to support innovation in water, sanitation, solid waste and drainage-related activities.

Just as Lusaka’s physical environment posed challenges for MCC’s infrastructure investments, the institutional environment proved a challenging context for the compact’s investment in local capacity development. Staffing issues limited the capacity of LWSC and LCC to absorb technical assistance and strengthen the institutions. LCC employed rotational staffing strategies that were a legacy of the model imposed by the British Civil Service prior to independence. 57  Originally designed to limit opportunities for corruption, rotational staffing makes it hard to build effective teams, departments, and functional units. Employees may not stay in a position long enough to build up expertise, and frequent transfers shift staff members without regard to the continuity of any training that has been provided. LWSC underwent several changes of senior leadership and board members over the course of the compact, as well as a reduction in the status of its units responsible for non-revenue water and asset management.

Assistance to Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company (LWSC)

When the compact was signed, LWSC had recently completed a financial turnaround, resulting in a financial surplus in 2009. Long-standing support from the World Bank for institutional reform had brought commercialization of services with significant improvements in service delivery. The utility held little debt, and it had undertaken operational measures to improve cash flow. However, its water and sewer assets were in a dire state, requiring large-scale rehabilitation and expansion to meet the needs of Lusaka’s growing population. To support MCC investments in improving the infrastructure, the compact funded tools and trainings for LWSC staff to reduce maintenance costs and extend the useful working life of the water and sewer systems.

Only after the compact started did it become clear that the apparent financial turnaround was more a matter of accounting than of structural change. LWSC’s definition for operating cost coverage had reflected a substantial underestimation of the true maintenance costs, and the utility operated in the red for much of the compact’s five-year timeline. The wide gap between true full-cost recovery and actual costs suggested a large degree of deferred maintenance. This financial situation was likely exacerbated by external factors—like drought and power reliability—that affected the amount of water LWSC could sell. The overall effect limited the efficacy of the technical assistance provided through the compact.

Compact-funded assistance to LWSC comprised of technical training and improvements in four key areas: asset management, environmental management and monitoring capabilities, reduction of non-revenue water, and social inclusion and gender mainstreaming.

Although LWSC had a basic awareness of the importance of asset management, that awareness had little influence or impact on actual practices. The asset management team sat low in the utility’s hierarchy and was not consulted as a routine advisor in LWSC’s business processes. The degraded state of the water and sewer infrastructure made managing these assets even more complex: it was difficult for LWSC to (1) know where their pipes were and what condition they were in; (2) identify needed expansion, maintenance, and repair projects and prioritize between them; and (3) allocate limited resources strategically (staff, funding, materials). A technical assistance contract funded through the Institutional Strengthening Activity helped LWSC rethink their asset management practices, take an inventory of their assets, install diagnostic equipment and ultrasonic monitoring devices throughout the water distribution system, set up a computerized register to track assets, and link all this information to a decision support system. This comprehensive, integrated approach was designed to allow LWSC to plan maintenance, asset renewal and capital programs in an affordable and systematic manner. It was intended to enable better service in terms of water pressure, water quality, and customer service, as well as improved transparency and ability to meet regulatory and reporting requirements. The technical assistance also helped LWSC analyze various maintenance options—doing the work in-house, hiring a third party via a performance-based contract, or a combination of the two—to determine which would be the most effective.

Improved governance of the water sector had brought environmental policies and regulations that LWSC struggled to comply with given the degraded state of its sewers and sewage treatment assets. The result was an administrative burden, requiring LWSC to apply for exceptions, exemptions, temporary waivers, and undergo frequent reviews – none of which would have been necessary if the utility was functioning properly. Accordingly, the compact invested in strengthening LWSC’s environmental management and monitoring capabilities, specifically for treated sewage and water quality. The compact funded the provision of environmental monitoring laboratory equipment and technologies as well as complementary training for operationalizing the laboratory. It also helped introduce an environmental information management system for LWSC and integrated it into the utility’s corporate culture and business systems.

Reducing non-revenue water was critical to the sustainability of LWSC’s business model. The Infrastructure Activity, discussed above, undertook efforts to reduce physical losses; the Institutional Strengthening Activity took on the challenge of commercial losses. The overall objective was to reduce non-revenue water by 23 percentage points, 58 ultimately improving the financial position of the utility. The compact funded a customer database clean-up exercise, which was expected to yield the largest non-revenue water reduction by correcting billing and administrative records to give LWSC more accurate information about their customers. For example, among commercial customers alone, more than 160,000 discrepancies were identified between the records on file and the updated information collected via survey. For the most part, the outdated records meant the commercial customers were being under-billed for their water usage. LWSC worked to correct these “variances,” but progress was slow due to lack of staff support and coordination. By the compact’s end date, approximately 60,000 records were updated. The database clean-up of all incorrect records that had been identified prior to and after the end of the compact was completed mid-August 2019. Specifically, a total of 181,067 records were updated and LWSC is developing a strategy for continuing the NRW and database clean-up activities as part of its regular operations to ensure sustainability of the compact investments.

LWSC’s largest debtor was the Government of Zambia, whose unpaid water bills were a significant contribution to non-revenue water. Resolving this issue was a key to improving LWSC’s financial situation. It was addressed through a condition precedent that required the GOZ to pay the water utility $11 million to clear their outstanding arrears—a debt accumulated as of 2013 from unpaid water bills of Government institutions, including the University Teaching Hospital (Lusaka’s largest hospital), police barracks, and national GOZ offices. Over the course of the compact, MCC and MCA investigated the complex problems behind these unpaid bills, arriving at a variety of solutions that included installing individual water meters at GOZ institutions, fixing the leaky pipes that were driving extremely high water bills, and even seeking approval from NWASCO 59 for an extraordinary rate increase if these issues were not being addressed appropriately by the GOZ. The rate increase was never requested during the compact, as MCC determined that government-funded efforts to address the underlying problems were adequate. Over the five-year compact period, GOZ payments of arrears to the water utility totaled nearly $22 million, 60  and as of 2018 LWSC was legally empowered to collect arrears directly from the GOZ institutions incurring those bills. At the compact’s completion, outstanding arrears stood at approximately $5.1 million. 61

Improving LWSC’s abilities to provide better and targeted services to the poor and to promote behavior change is central to ensuring that customers connect to the network and stay connected. Widespread inability or unwillingness to pay for improved services threatens the connection rates required to realize health, time, and income benefits or to ensure proper functioning of the infrastructure. A technical assistance package for social inclusion and gender mainstreaming and for IEC capacity in LWSC supported the utility to develop the structures, policies, capacities, and procedures needed to provide appropriate, affordable and sustainable services that are aligned with the income flows of the poor and underserved populations present in the peri-urban areas. This package included support for LWSC to develop a Social and Gender Policy and a revised Peri-Urban Policy setting out utility priorities for extending and maintaining services in peri-urban areas. It supported the establishment of new customer engagement approaches for frontline staff, the development of Customer Engagement Guidelines, and a revised Credit Control and Debt Management Policy clarifying the utility’s pro-poor approaches to bill payment and debtor management. The work also supported LWSC to develop flexible payment mechanisms, extending payment plans for debtors and allowing billing systems to receive micro-payments electronically (e.g., mobile money), an approach well-suited for households that rely on daily wage payments. Other priority measures include text messaging for bill-payment reminders and outreach to customers at risk of disconnection, shifting away from disconnection as the default solution to customer debts. The technical assistance consultant also worked with LWSC to build capacity on designing and implementing IEC and sanitation marketing materials and campaigns.

Compact-funded technical assistance emphasized capacity building and participatory approaches aimed at building strong ownership and leadership by LWSC staff. By the end of the compact, LWSC had developed workplans, formulated an implementation strategy extending three years beyond the end of the compact, appointed staff, and integrated social inclusion, gender mainstreaming and IEC and sanitation marketing priorities in the 2019 budget process in order to sustain these initiatives going forward. LWSC staff also gained training, some hands-on experience, and a portfolio of IEC and sanitation marketing materials to promote the utility’s water and sanitation services. As of closure in November 2018, the compact had supported LWSC in reaching approximately 248,000 people with messaging on water and bill management, toilet maintenance, sanitation, and hygiene.

While the social inclusion and gender mainstreaming and IEC efforts resulted in new policies and extensive outreach, limited investment in these actions prevented the work from reaching its full potential. The lack of funding for formative research led MCA to rely on work donated by another organization (Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor, WSUP) to inform the design of IEC and sanitation marketing messages. This partnership filled a key gap, but it also translated to delays and shortcuts in message design and pre-testing. In particular, WSUP’s research did not cover the four Ps—place, price, product, promotion—that are a core part of effective sanitation marketing campaigns, and messaging was unable to adequately cover this content. In sum, the original budget for this work was inadequate, and therefore MCC and MCA expended considerable effort trying to cover the resource gap.

The social inclusion and gender mainstreaming and IEC technical assistance to LWSC was further hampered in the first year by contractor under-performance. By the compact’s end, the work achieved the results noted above, but the technical assistance consultant lacked sufficient time to support LWSC in piloting many of the new policies. LWSC successfully rolled out the flexible e-payment and micro-payment mechanisms, and was keen to take over IEC implementation and other pilots under the technical assistance consultant’s oversight, but the consultant did not have the budget to support this. Despite these missed opportunities for institutional learning, LWSC appeared eager to continue the work: the utility passed the aforementioned 2019 budget funding the implementation strategy that will allow it to continue operationalizing the new policies and practices developed under the compact.

Assistance to Lusaka City Council (LCC)

As the local governing body in Lusaka, LCC is divided into eight departments that provide a wide range of municipal services. Stormwater and drainage management fall to the Engineering Department, while the Public Health Department is responsible for solid waste management. In an urban setting like Lusaka, the efficacy of the stormwater drainage infrastructure depends on a number of factors including the design approach, the quality of construction, and appropriate management of solid waste. The city must ensure effective removal of debris from the drainage channels in order for the drains to collect, convey and dispose of stormwater, ultimately reducing the frequency and severity of flooding as well as addressing the impact of stormwater on downstream communities. In addition, an effective program of corrective and preventive maintenance is imperative to sustain the benefits of the drainage infrastructure. Prior to the compact, LCC struggled to fulfill these responsibilities. The effects of chronic understaffing and poor development of existing staff, even at senior levels, were reflected in ineffective operations and an absence of long-term planning.

Technical assistance to LCC under the compact therefore focused on defining the flooding and solid waste management problems in Lusaka and developing a road map to mitigate them. After assessing the local government’s capacity to manage the drainage system and municipal solid waste, 62  the activity conducted an options analysis to identify a variety of plausible strategies that would promote the sustainability of MCC’s investments in drainage infrastructure. Building from these evaluations and from a Lusaka drainage investment plan 63  prepared with MCC support during the development of the compact, the technical assistance program developed a Stormwater Management Master Plan for LCC. This comprehensive 25-year plan covered all areas of the city and included a root cause analysis of flooding problems throughout the greater Lusaka region. It proposed a menu of technical options to reduce flooding and explicitly incorporated all of the drainage infrastructure funded by the compact.

In addition to technical assistance on long-term strategic planning for stormwater, the compact built up LCC’s capacity to manage drainage infrastructure and services in and around the city. These institutional strengthening activities focused on the twin pillars of drain maintenance and solid waste management. The compact developed a drain maintenance regime that would enable LCC to maintain the city’s stormwater system sustainably, efficiently, and effectively. 

The question of how best to keep trash out of the drains was more challenging. Previous efforts had failed to secure adequate solid waste management for the residents of Lusaka. Waste collection practices varied from neighborhood to neighborhood: while LCC collected trash and cleaned drains in some areas, other areas were served by private contractors authorized by LCC. Many parts of the city had no official waste collection, and the insufficiency of Lusaka’s solid waste removal services left some neighborhoods with no options for appropriate waste disposal at all. After weighing the strategies outlined in the aforementioned options analysis, the GOZ ultimately issued a Cabinet Memo to create an autonomous solid waste management company independent of LCC. (LCC retained responsibility for maintaining the drains.) The decision to corporatize solid waste management and “ringfence” this function was made in part to address the challenges of relying on rotating municipal staff. Early in the compact, MCC had tried to stop or defer the transfer of key staff members away from the solid waste management team at LCC, but was unsuccessful. Given the revised approach to tackle solid waste management, MCC modified one of the conditions of the compact that originally required the GOZ to provide a total of $6 million to support LCC’s drainage maintenance. MCC revised this condition so that the $6 million government contribution could support both the establishment and operations of an autonomous solid waste management company and the establishment of an improved drainage maintenance unit under LCC. 

Similar to the compact-funded assistance to LWSC, the compact supported LCC in strengthening its environmental management and compliance systems in order to enhance the sustainability of the compact’s investments and contribute to the health and wellbeing of residents. This assistance included protocols for proper handling and safe disposal of materials removed from the drains during maintenance activities (including solid waste, silt, and other debris). It also supported staff development at LCC by introducing occupational health and safety practices to maintenance crews.

Like LWSC, LCC also benefitted from technical assistance on social inclusion, gender mainstreaming and IEC to improve service provision in peri-urban areas with regard to solid waste management for drain maintenance. Technical assistance helped the newly-established autonomous waste management company set out and work towards the goals of affordable, sustainable solid waste services across diverse customer segments, identify community engagement guidance, and define waste collection contracting opportunities for community-based enterprises in order to leverage their significant role in collecting waste in hard-to-reach areas. The new solid waste management entity also adopted lessons learned from the compact-funded LCC information, education and communication campaigns and developed and costed its own Information, Education and Communication Strategy.

The activity also supported LCC on community engagement through the development of guidelines, staff training and piloting in the areas where compact-funded drains were constructed to engage communities around the maintenance of the drains. The technical assistance supported LCC to build capacity to identify IEC needs for solid waste management and drainage; and to develop and manage systems that promote behavior change, uptake of solid waste services and care of physical assets in low-income peri-urban areas. As of November 2018, the LCC campaign had reached nearly 95,000 people 64 , over 8,000 market stalls, and numerous school and community groups. Technical assistance placed emphasis on capacity building and participatory approaches built strong ownership and leadership in LCC; the approaches and tools provided by the technical assistance were adopted by LCC departments well beyond those occupied with drainage and solid waste and were applied to other development projects in Lusaka. LCC retained community mobilizers for IEC efforts out of its own budget and continued implementing campaigns at the time of compact-end. Nevertheless, IEC to promote behavior change and curb illegal dumping in the drains was largely unsuccessful during the compact given the absence of solid waste services in Lusaka and it will continue to be ineffective until solid waste services are available and affordable to the communities along the drains. Once the solid waste management entity is operational, it is expected that the urban and peri-urban areas in Lusaka Province will have solid waste collection and cleaning services, as well as related recycling, transfer and disposal services. Unfortunately, this entity was only stood up at the end of the compact and service delivery had not commenced.

  • 1. CIA World Factbook.
  • 2. 2010 Zambia Census,
  • 3. Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office,
  • 4. CIA World Factbook.
  • 5. Central Statistical Office, Republic of Zambia projected increase of population from 2011 to 2035 as reported on
  • 6. Sanitation refers to both sewer services and on-site solutions (including pit latrines and septic tanks).
  • 7. MCC Zambia Threshold Program Final Status Report,
  • 8. The methodology is set forth in Elena Ianchovichina and Susanna Lundstrom (2008), “What are the Constraints to Inclusive Growth in Zambia?” (Policy Note; Report No. 44286-ZM).
  • 9. For example, following the approach in the source cited in note 9 above.
  • 10. The compact largely addressed peri-urban areas. Although urban water was not identified as binding during the constraints analysis, some urban investments were built into the project due to both (a) the connected nature of water, sewer, and drain networks that make it infeasible to totally isolate urban from peri-urban areas, and (b) the importance of urban areas to the utility’s revenue model.
  • 11. Under MCC’s country ownership model, governments receiving MCC assistance are responsible for implementing the MCC-funded programs. Partner governments establish units known as accountable entities referred to as MCAs to manage implementation for compact projects.
  • 12. For discussion of the ERR update at EIF, see the Explanation of Results subsection of the Project Results section.
  • 13. These figures are from
  • 14. The adoption rate is the percentage of eligible households who choose to connect to the new water supply and sewerage infrastructure.
  • 15. MCC has recently increased its focus on cost-benefit analysis of policy and institutional reform interventions and developed new methodologies for this work. For the Zambia closeout ERR developed a standalone estimate of the benefits associated with the compact’s Institutional Strengthening Activity.
  • 16. Alternative assumptions regarding the quality of maintenance and the evolution of benefits would change the Zambia Project ERR as follows:  If benefits fell linearly to zero over 30 years, the ERR decreases to 3.8%.  If benefits fell to zero over 20 years, the ERR decreases to -1.5%.
  • 17. Ministerial Statement on Water Resources Management by Honorable Dora Siliya, M.P., May 2016
  • 18. The Water Resources Management Authority’s objective is to promote and adopt a dynamic, gender-sensitive, integrated, interactive, participatory and multisector approach to water resource management and development that includes human, land, environmental and socio-economic considerations, especially poverty reduction and the elimination of waterborne diseases, including malaria.
  • 19. Water Supply Investment Master Plan: Investment Strategy Report, Jan 2011.
  • 20. Ibid.
  • 21. Non-revenue water is treated water that goes unpaid for. There are two main categories of non-revenue water: (a) water that is lost through leaks and broken pipes (physical losses), and (b) water that goes unbilled or unpaid for due to issues such as inaccurate water meters, water theft, poor management of billing records, and the like (commercial losses).
  • 22. The idea of adequate water quality refers to delivering water to consumers that meets drinking water standards.
  • 23. Final Sanitation Master Plan, Lusaka, Zambia. June 24, 2011.
  • 24. Study on Comprehensive Urban Development Plan for the City of Lusaka in the Republic of Zambia, 25.
  • 26.
  • 27. LWSC is also responsible for the water supply in the towns of Kafue, Chongwe and Luanga. The Water Supply Investment Master Plan therefore also included an additional six projects spread across these three towns, bringing the estimated total costs of all the projects outlined in the Plan to $815 million.
  • 28. The Water Supply Investment Master Plan does not elaborate on the 20 percent of households with access to safe water but lacking a household connection to the municipal supply. Presumably this 20 percent includes (a) households who choose not to connect to the municipal water supply in their neighborhood (e.g., perhaps because they prefer their existing private borehole well, because of affordability considerations, etc.), as well as (b) households in neighborhoods that lack the option of household-level connections but are served by community water kiosks connected to the municipal supply.
  • 29. To contextualize these statistics on non-revenue water (NRW): Using performance data from the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET, at, the World Bank reported that NRW averages around 35 percent for developing countries. However, underreporting and geographic coverage gaps in the IBNET database led the authors to estimate that the true overall NRW level for the developing world is closer to 40-50 percent. The report further suggested that cutting these losses in half is an attainable target; the best-performing developing world utilities achieve NRW levels below 25 percent. See Kingdom, B.; Roland, L.; and P. Marin. (2006) The challenge of reducing non-revenue water (NRW) in developing countries – how the private sector can help: a look at performance-based service contracting. Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board discussion paper no. 8. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. According to the Water Supply Investment Master Plan referenced in footnote 26, the Zambian independent utility regulator (NWASCO) considers NRW levels above 25 percent to be “unacceptable,” 20-25 percent to be “acceptable,” and below 20 percent to be “good.”
  • 30. A “just-in-time redesign” is a last-minute change where technical details are adjusted shortly before construction begins. Ideally, plans and engineering designs are developed ahead of time, to allow for optimum planning, efficiency, and coordination of various project components.
  • 31. Resettlement refers both to physical displacement (relocation or loss of shelter) and to economic displacement (loss of assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or other means of livelihood) as a result of project-related land acquisition or restrictions on land use. It can be either permanent or temporary depending on the circumstances. Resettlement is considered involuntary when affected persons or communities do not have the right to refuse land acquisition or restrictions on land use that result in physical or economic displacement. This occurs in cases of (i) lawful expropriation or temporary or permanent restrictions on land use and (ii) negotiated settlements in which the buyer can resort to expropriation or impose legal restrictions on land use if negotiations with the seller fail. See International Finance Corporation. (2012). Performance Standard 5 Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement, retrievable from:
  • 32. A project-affected person (“PAP”) is an individual or a family (household) that loses a home, land, or business interests because of project-required land acquisition. Any given resettlement impact could affect one or more people depending on whether it is registered for an individual, a household, a business, or other entity (such as a church or other organization).
  • 33. Throughout the livelihood restoration process, gender expertise and targeted support were extended to mitigate the particular risks that female project-affected people faced retaining control of their compensation within their households and investing in new opportunities.
  • 34. The 30 percent target was drawn from a Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol. That protocol is now outdated. However many countries use 30 percent as a target for women’s representation in politics, and a number of companies have followed suit for board and executive level representation.
  • 35. World Economic Forum, 2016. The Future of Jobs, Table 14.
  • 36. A borehole well is a narrow shaft drilled vertically into the ground. It allows for pumping (extraction) and/or sampling of groundwater.
  • 37. Water Supply Investment Master Plan: Investment Strategy Report, Jan 2011.
  • 38. The compact did not fund private plumbing. Property owners had to cover the expense of installing any necessary pipes and hardware to connect their building with the new water pipes at their plot, as well as paying the utility’s water connection fees.
  • 39. As mentioned in the context of water connections, the compact did not fund private plumbing. This policy also applied to sewer connections. Property owners had to cover the expense of installing toilets, water closets, and any necessary pipes and hardware to connect their building with the new sewer line at their plot, as well as paying the utility’s sewerage connection fees.  Through the Innovation Grant Program (see the Institutional Strengthening section, below), the compact did support the creation of a small revolving loan fund to help finance household connections to the sanitation network.
  • 40. After the new sewage treatment plan comes online, it is expected that Kaunda Square will provide additional treatment capacity for heavy flows during the wet season.
  • 41. In Lusaka, especially in the peri-urban areas, the toilet is often installed in a small outbuilding constructed for the purpose. Unless the toilet uses pour-flush, a water connection is necessary. In peri-urban areas that never had water or sewer lines before the compact, households required both water and sewer connection fees at the same time.
  • 42. These figures were calculated through compact-funded studies.
  • 43. The Public Health Act prohibits pit latrines and septic tanks within 200 feet of a sewer line. Residents must therefore connect to the sewer line.
  • 44. After one year with one of two planned trash traps in place, it became clear that LCC was not yet able to manage the operation of trash traps of this design. Rather than installing the second trash trap (of the same design, intended to work in concert with the first one to improve the environmental performance of the drainage system), the first trash trap was removed and the materials placed in storage. LCC will install both traps when they are prepared to manage them. The operationalization of an autonomous solid waste management company (discussed in the Assistance to Lusaka City Council subsection, below) is expected to reduce the trash load, which should make it easier for LCC to operate and maintain the trash traps.
  • 45. The drainage works were not fully completed due to performance problems with the contractor, which had significant cash flow problems and filed for protection from creditors in December 2018.
  • 46. Total length of transmission lines constructed and rehabilitated. This indicator is tied to strengthening Water Supply.
  • 47. Total number of connections with operating meter/ total number of connections, expressed in percentage
  • 48. In year four of compact implementation, after works were underway, consultants used billing and system input data from LWSC to estimate the total baseline NRW at 56.8 percent. In the same analysis, it was estimated that the total NRW could be reduced to 41.3 percent by the end of the project, suggesting that the original target of 34 percent may have been overly ambitious.
  • 49. This indicator includes estimates total quarterly water production from the Iolanda water treatment plant (40% production) and the 120+ boreholes around Lusaka (60% production). The indicator is also reported on by LWSC and per the data quality review this indicator is estimated because there are no bulk water meters at Iolanda or at most boreholes.
  • 50. A negative completion rate requires some explanation. The compact sought to increase water produced from 23.09 million cubic meters per quarter to 24.63 million cubic meters per quarter, an increase of 1.54 million cubic meters. However, water production at compact close sat at 18.85 million cubic meters, a decrease of 4.24 million cubic meters compared to the baseline.  Dividing the actual decrease (-4.24) by the targeted increase (1.54) and converting to percent generates a completion rate of -274 percent. 
  • 51. This indicator is reported by LWSC on a quarterly basis and has fluctuated throughout the compact. It is an average for all districts of Lusaka; the number of hours of water supply can vary dramatically by neighborhood and due to inconsistent availability of electricity (e.g., load shedding during the dry season) affects the continuity of service, but no data are available on the frequency and duration of power outages at baseline or over the course of the compact, so their impact on the performance measured by this indicator is unknown.
  • 52. A negative completion rate requires some explanation. The compact sought to increase the city-wide average availability of water service by 4 hours daily, from 18 to 22 hours per day. However, water service stood at 17 hours per day at compact close, a decrease of 1 hour daily.  Dividing the actual decrease (-1) by the targeted increase (4) and converting to percent yields a completion rate of -25 percent.
  • 53. Total number of new water supply connections in the project area. These are household connections and do not include kiosk connections. This indicator is a subset of Meters installed/replaced and should not be aggregated up for reporting
  • 54. The target should have been revised to reflect rescoping early in the compact, reflecting that the work was completed. However, the erroneous target cannot now be retroactively corrected due to internal policy for transparency and accountability.
  • 55. The drainage works were not fully completed due to performance problems with the contractor, which had significant cash flow problems and filed for protection from creditors in December 2018.
  • 56. Cogswell, Lynne. 2008. Development of Sanitation Marketing Strategy and Hygiene Promotion Program for Peri-Urban Settlements of Lusaka, Zambia. Market Analysis report prepared for the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program / Africa Ministry of Local Government and Housing, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company. The definition of “extreme poverty” used here was defined by Zambia’s Central Statistics Office in 2003 using local currency: K32,861 per month per adult (equivalent to $7/month per adult in 2003 dollars).
  • 57. In rotational staffing, employees are reassigned or “rotated” to a new position every few years. In organizations like the civil service with staffing needs across a wide geography, these rotations often involve a move from one city or region to another. Assignments typically have different job specifications and build flexibility rather than specialization or a linear progression of skills.
  • 58. It was not possible to estimate the relative proportion of physical and commercial losses when targets for non-revenue water (NRW) reduction were set early in the compact. As reported above under the explanation of results for the Infrastructure Activity, the final overall NRW reduction fell short of the target due to combination of implementation challenges and data quality issues.
  • 59. The National Water and Sanitation Council (NWASCO) is the independent utility regulator.
  • 60. Including the $11 million paid to clear arrears that were outstanding at the start of the compact, as required by a condition precedent.
  • 61. The outstanding arrears at the end of the compact reflected unpaid arrears identified in the last internal audit in October of 2017. The Government’s dependence on audits to trigger arears payments and comply with the ongoing condition precendent was the driver behind the move to legally empower LWSC to collect arrears directly.
  • 62. This assessment considered capacity for operations, maintenance, and capital improvement.
  • 63. Drainage Investment Plan for Priority Areas in Lusaka, Zambia, 2011, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
  • 64. A compact-funded Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report from May 2015 indicated that the total population in this area was 188,000 people.
  • 65. Bio-latrines are latrines connected to a biogas digester. The design minimizes blockage risks and the challenges of emptying the pit under the latrine, while providing primary treatment for sanitary waste and producing biogas that can be sold to nearby street vendors and businesses.
  • 66. Total annual operational revenues divided by total annual operating costs. This indicator helps assess the financial health and stability of the utility.
  • 67. Ultimately this contribution was paid by the Ministry of Finance due to budget constraints by LCC. As previously mentioned this condition was revised to also provide for solid waste management expenses in addition to drainage maintenance and repair given the decoupling of solid waste management from the LCC and establishment of a new Solid Waste Management Company.
  • 68. In neighborhoods that do not yet have sewer lines, suitably designed on-site sanitation options exist that can replace unlined pit latrines.
  • 69. Since groundwater is an unseen resource, it is harder to measure and easier to over-exploit than surface water. But if an accurate estimate of the natural recharge rate is available and the political will is there, it’s possible to balance withdrawals against recharge so as to avoid depleting the aquifer and compromising the future viability of the groundwater supply.
  • 70. Provided that LWSC maintains effective chlorination of the treated water supply, as enabled by MCC investments, there will be a measure of protection against microbial contamination of the groundwater. However, LWSC is unable to treat for nitrate contamination, which also comes from pit latrines. Prevention is the best option, and in the case of Lusaka this would entail eliminating unlined pit latrines and digging out decommissioned ones to remove the human waste that is the nitrate source.
  • 71. In February 2012, an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) noted elevated levels of nitrate in the groundwater from several borehole wells that are part of LWSC’s supply network. These wells also had microbiological contamination. The ESIA concluded that the nitrate source was pollution from pit latrines and other waste disposal activities. Due to coordination shortcomings at MCC, awareness of potential nitrate contamination challenges was lost until 2017 when an external evaluator, CDC, reported that they had measured elevated levels of nitrate in water supplied by LWSC to some areas of the city.