Star Report: Zambia Compact | May 2020

Lessons from the Compact

Place greater emphasis on implementing entity capacity and incentives in order to maintain infrastructure assets, implement policy reforms, and ensure the sustainability of MCC’s investments. Sustainable practices can be improved by an incentive structure that motivates the utility to perform on a commercial basis and through technical assistance for institutional strengthening and capacity development. In Zambia, preliminary review of the outputs of institutional strengthening efforts on non-revenue water reduction, asset management, social inclusion and gender mainstreaming/IEC and drain maintenance indicated that these initiatives have yet to demonstrate uptake of long-term sustainable practices. Several key factors could have improved the effectiveness of the institutional strengthening activity:

  1. Appropriate project management structure, with designated organizational roles at the MCA to support institutional reform and capacity building activities separately from and yet in close coordination with infrastructure activities. At MCA-Zambia, one infrastructure director was assigned to manage both infrastructure and institutional strengthening activities. Managing infrastructure occupied a significant portion of the director’s attention, while insufficient time was allocated to working closely with the implementing entities to ensure successful implementation and ownership of the institutional strengthening technical assistance;
  2. The compact should have included all relevant regulators. In Zambia, the water regulator was not part of the compact. It should have been included as an implementing entity to help provide the right incentive structure given their role in ensuring technical and financial performance to LWSC;
  3. Depending on the specific project and country context, MCAs should place implementing entity staff in the organizational structure and physically embed them in the MCA office to ensure that there is a high level of coordination with implementing entities. Implementing entity agreements should include requirements and funding for new implementing entity staff to support both infrastructure activities and institutional strengthening/policy reform activities. This staff should also play an important role in the handing over of completed infrastructure projects, following up on policy reforms, and ensuring that implementing entities have budgeted and staffed for operating and maintaining new and refurbished compact assets. (Note: MCA did have some implementing staff embedded in the office but their roles and responsibilities were not adequately developed.);
  4. Design a better balance between investments in technical solutions on the one hand and social policies and behavior change on the other, as the latter are critical to the risk management and sustainability of the former. To ensure connections, service uptake, and behavior change, implementing entities such as LWSC and LCC need to (a) develop structures, policies, and procedures that will enhance their ability to provide appropriate, affordable, and sustainable services for the poor; (b) identify information, education, and communications (IEC) needs for water and sanitation, and solid waste management and drainage, respectively, and (c) develop and manage IEC systems that promote behavior change. While substantial work on these policies and programs was undertaken, and initial monitoring and evaluation reports indicate their successful adoption by the implementing entities, this work was under-resourced relative to the scale of response required by LWSC and LCC to meet the service needs of the targeted communities and to ensure sustainability of infrastructure.

Leverage investment master plans. Investment master plans for both water supply and sanitation were drawn up during the development of the Zambia Compact, and a stormwater management master plan was developed during compact implementation. These master plans not only helped the GOZ prioritize MCC investments, but also added significant value beyond the compact investment by outlining clearly to the private sector and donor community where funding was necessary, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars of leveraged funding. If no relevant sector investment plans exist, they should be prepared during compact development. And if they do exist, they should be used to help prioritize compact investments.

Consider using incidence analysis to inform beneficiary identification. Even before master plans were available, MCC’s project design and due diligence process would have benefited from an incidence analysis study linking water and sanitation sector expenditures with associated physical outputs and levels of service and access enjoyed by different classes of consumers. Such work could highlight inequalities across the population and serve to inform strategies for selecting potential beneficiaries. This analysis could inform estimates of likely levels of subsidy needed to defray the costs of initial connections to the water and sewerage networks. An extension of such work, moreover, could include an examination of institutional capacity and operational effectiveness to increase MCC’s understanding of planning, budgeting, and spending (for both capital investments and O&M expenditures) and the association of these factors with key sectoral performance metrics.

Use conditions precedent to drive sustainability, but don’t sacrifice flexibility. Conditions precedent (CPs) are an essential tool to strengthen implementing entities, thus supporting the sustainability of these institutions and securing lasting benefits from MCC’s compact investments. However, CPs must be flexible enough to allow MCC and MCA to adjust to changing conditions on the ground. For example, installing bulk pre-paid meters on approximately 200 government buildings was a condition precedent before the Zambia Compact could enter into force. This CP was designed to eliminate reoccurring arrears and improve the financial viability and sustainability of the water utility. However, it was a prescriptive solution to a symptom of a larger and complex management challenge. That management challenge needed more due diligence and understanding, which might have revealed better solutions prior to the design of the CP. A more effective approach would address the root issue and lead to a permanent resolution to the GOZ’s arrears to the utility. The method to satisfy the CP should be collaboratively developed and adapted over time with the parties before the CP deadline. In the case of this compact some CPs had to be changed to create a more effective outcome pathway.

Plan adaptability into dynamic urban construction environments. Public urban environments are multi-layered systems that include utility services, vehicle and pedestrian traffic, and public and private interests. A city without planning, like Lusaka, is characterized by unpredictable and rapidly changing land use, irregular traffic flows, a lack of legal easements, and utility corridors without georeferenced locations. All these characteristics are risks in the planning, design, and construction of infrastructure. Urban work requires significant upfront planning to locate and negotiate utility crossings, traffic disruptions, community reactions, and safety concerns. Procurement methods that consider more than just cost can support adaptive approaches. Urban works need contractors with experience in challenging environments; a selection that is partly or wholly based on quality may be considered to improve construction outputs.

Adopt a flexible, just-in-time approach to resettlement in urban contexts. In unplanned and rapidly changing urban environments, it is difficult to identify the people who will be affected by the project until detailed designs are complete and the project impact area has been physically identified and marked. When the construction works occur months or years after resettlement planning is conducted there is a high risk that circumstances on the ground in the construction corridor will have changed considerably at the time of construction, and that earlier plans and related cost estimates will prove inaccurate. Close coordination between key parties is necessary so that contractors can segment and sequence their work with just-in-time resettlement efforts. Dynamic population growth and implementation delays can both lead to dramatic changes in the final design and resettlement impacts. At the beginning of the Zambia Compact, the resettlement budget was roughly $6.7 million, and it was estimated that there would be 1,600 project-affected people. By the end of the compact, the budget increased to $26.3 million with 5,167 project-affected people. The difference was due to changes in construction design, rapid growth in Lusaka, and a two-year lag between the original resettlement plans and construction implementation, illustrating how work in a dense, dynamic urban environment requires a more nimble and adaptive approach to estimating costs and planning budgets.

Integrate stakeholder engagement throughout compact implementation. MCA integrated several MCC stakeholder engagement requirements into one overall stakeholder engagement plan that clearly defined roles and responsibilities while not overburdening MCA with excessive bureaucracy. Stakeholder consultation and engagement should be addressed in the design of the project and in the corresponding budget. MCA’s early and inclusive consultation helped minimize the number of grievances, garnered support for the project, and facilitated the resettlement and construction processes despite the large increase in the number of people who were affected by resettlement. Consistent, two-way engagement with stakeholders, particularly those who are directly impacted by construction, promotes positive outcomes for the community and the compact.

Carefully consider whether to use a grant facility to strategically complement compact investments. In Zambia, the Innovation Grant Program (IGP) was intended to complement compact investments. It funded sanitation projects that allowed households to connect to compact-financed wastewater networks, and it supported solid waste projects to reduce litter in Lusaka and help ensure sustainability of compact drainage investments. In addition, it identified a water supply project that allowed the compact to test a model for the provision of clean water outside of the major infrastructure investments. By providing more flexible funding instruments for partnerships and demand-driven projects, the IGP was a tool with potential for high impact. However, the execution and oversight processes could have been streamlined to reduce the time and cost of administering the facility. Increased standardization of grant-making processes and learning from other institutions on the best grant-making approaches should be a priority for future grant facilities. Indeed, MCC has already begun these efforts, particularly for grant facilities which are leveraged by the private sector. In some contexts, MCC might also consider partnering with other institutions, such as those that have significant experience in very small, community-based grants.

Develop evidence-based approaches to meet user connection targets for MCC-financed infrastructure, such as sanitation networks. The Zambia Compact did foresee the need to support households in connecting to the wastewater network, and it asked the GOZ to dedicate funds for these efforts. However, the compact did not specify an approach to achieve connection targets. As a result, the strategy wasn’t laid out until the compact was already in implementation, and the resources to design and execute the program (e.g., MCA staffing for oversight) were insufficient. The connection work was, however, of critical importance. Without a successful approach to getting households hooked up to the sewer system, the compact could not achieve its desired results in terms of improved sanitation. Furthermore, sewers require a certain minimum flow through the system in order to function optimally, so insufficient user connections will jeopardize the infrastructure operations. The importance of user connections to the infrastructure suggests that more emphasis should have been placed on utility policies and practical support to help households overcome affordability barriers that made it difficult for them to connect to the network and build an appropriate toilet. Also important is preparing household-level water and sanitation connection outreach during compact development, with more resources provided for development of IEC materials and execution of outreach campaigns during implementation. In addition, implementation actors focused on infrastructure should be sensitized to the importance of engaging with those responsible for outreach and connection activities so that works and outreach may be coordinated through integrated work planning.

Establish voluntary female employment targets for the temporary employment opportunities created by MCC-financed infrastructure works. Globally, women represent only 10 percent of the workforce in construction jobs. In the U.S., they are 9 percent of the construction workforce and in Zambia only 3 percent. MCA was able to broaden access to the temporary employment generated through compact investments by encouraging contractors to hire women (as well as to hire from local communities). This was done through explicit language in standard bidding documents encouraging the employment of women, strong implementation and oversight structures on site, and high level managerial support—all of which were simple steps that brought visible impact. The works contracts set a voluntary target of 30 percent female employment as well as requirements for compliance with working conditions standards. These measures resulted in women holding approximately 22 percent of the jobs created under the construction works. Women worked in a range of occupations—as professionals, managers, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers. MCC will continue to improve upon this approach to ensure broad access to employment opportunities stemming from compact investments in other partner countries.

Provide prescriptive health and safety guidance early for proactive impact. Globally, construction health and safety is a regulated government function. In developing countries, however, donors are challenged to require health and safety controls because government institutions are insufficiently robust in policies and implementation. MCC developed, and MCA chose to accept, a prescriptive health and safety program for the Zambia Compact. Prepared well in advance of construction, it included a Health and Safety Manual as part of the Invitation for Bids. The program fostered a culture of safety, and it supported MCA’s capacity to invest in staff and in measures to manage health and safety during the construction phase of the project. As a means to strengthen health and safety programs for other infrastructure projects in developing countries, the Health and Safety Manual should be updated to 1) take into account local practices, 2) match the type of infrastructure activity (e.g., water, roads, power, etc.), and 3) be user-friendly for developing countries.

Set realistic expectations for health benefits from WASH investments. There is no question that a clean water supply, adequate sanitation, and good hygiene practices are crucial to public health. However, it is important to set realistic expectations for the health benefits that can be achieved through any single WASH intervention, and for the time frame over which these benefits may appear. Exposure to waterborne disease comes through multiple pathways—including not only every drink of water throughout the day, but also food, swimming, bathing, dirty hands, flies, irrigation water and manure fertilizers in garden plots, etc.— and it is the cumulative dose across all these pathways that determines whether a person gets sick. The relationship between the incidence of illness and exposure to enteric pathogens is non-linear: public health literature tells us that even a very large decrease in exposure will generate no health benefit at all if the residual exposure is still high enough to make people get sick regularly. Eliminating the dominant exposure pathway is not necessarily sufficient to reduce the incidence of disease if the remaining exposure pathways are big enough. But at some point, a small additional decrease in exposure will bump the system over the threshold, and with overall exposure to disease-causing organisms being low enough, each additional reduction in exposure will correspond to a visible health benefit. This system is illustrated in Figure 3. Expecting that health benefits will appear shortly after the completion of an MCC WASH project assumes that MCC’s investment will be the one to bump the system over the threshold. The non-linear nature of the system poses an additional challenge: it is difficult to know how to value the benefits of a WASH investment that makes a permanent and significant dent in exposure without achieving measureable health outcomes, even though it has laid the foundation for a future project to see health benefits from an additional small exposure reduction that would not otherwise have been significant enough to matter.

  • 1. CIA World Factbook.
  • 2. 2010 Zambia Census,
  • 3. Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office,
  • 4. CIA World Factbook.
  • 5. Central Statistical Office, Republic of Zambia projected increase of population from 2011 to 2035 as reported on
  • 6. Sanitation refers to both sewer services and on-site solutions (including pit latrines and septic tanks).
  • 7. MCC Zambia Threshold Program Final Status Report,
  • 8. The methodology is set forth in Elena Ianchovichina and Susanna Lundstrom (2008), “What are the Constraints to Inclusive Growth in Zambia?” (Policy Note; Report No. 44286-ZM).
  • 9. For example, following the approach in the source cited in note 9 above.
  • 10. The compact largely addressed peri-urban areas. Although urban water was not identified as binding during the constraints analysis, some urban investments were built into the project due to both (a) the connected nature of water, sewer, and drain networks that make it infeasible to totally isolate urban from peri-urban areas, and (b) the importance of urban areas to the utility’s revenue model.
  • 11. Under MCC’s country ownership model, governments receiving MCC assistance are responsible for implementing the MCC-funded programs. Partner governments establish units known as accountable entities referred to as MCAs to manage implementation for compact projects.
  • 12. For discussion of the ERR update at EIF, see the Explanation of Results subsection of the Project Results section.
  • 13. These figures are from
  • 14. The adoption rate is the percentage of eligible households who choose to connect to the new water supply and sewerage infrastructure.
  • 15. MCC has recently increased its focus on cost-benefit analysis of policy and institutional reform interventions and developed new methodologies for this work. For the Zambia closeout ERR developed a standalone estimate of the benefits associated with the compact’s Institutional Strengthening Activity.
  • 16. Alternative assumptions regarding the quality of maintenance and the evolution of benefits would change the Zambia Project ERR as follows:  If benefits fell linearly to zero over 30 years, the ERR decreases to 3.8%.  If benefits fell to zero over 20 years, the ERR decreases to -1.5%.
  • 17. Ministerial Statement on Water Resources Management by Honorable Dora Siliya, M.P., May 2016
  • 18. The Water Resources Management Authority’s objective is to promote and adopt a dynamic, gender-sensitive, integrated, interactive, participatory and multisector approach to water resource management and development that includes human, land, environmental and socio-economic considerations, especially poverty reduction and the elimination of waterborne diseases, including malaria.
  • 19. Water Supply Investment Master Plan: Investment Strategy Report, Jan 2011.
  • 20. Ibid.
  • 21. Non-revenue water is treated water that goes unpaid for. There are two main categories of non-revenue water: (a) water that is lost through leaks and broken pipes (physical losses), and (b) water that goes unbilled or unpaid for due to issues such as inaccurate water meters, water theft, poor management of billing records, and the like (commercial losses).
  • 22. The idea of adequate water quality refers to delivering water to consumers that meets drinking water standards.
  • 23. Final Sanitation Master Plan, Lusaka, Zambia. June 24, 2011.
  • 24. Study on Comprehensive Urban Development Plan for the City of Lusaka in the Republic of Zambia, 25.
  • 26.
  • 27. LWSC is also responsible for the water supply in the towns of Kafue, Chongwe and Luanga. The Water Supply Investment Master Plan therefore also included an additional six projects spread across these three towns, bringing the estimated total costs of all the projects outlined in the Plan to $815 million.
  • 28. The Water Supply Investment Master Plan does not elaborate on the 20 percent of households with access to safe water but lacking a household connection to the municipal supply. Presumably this 20 percent includes (a) households who choose not to connect to the municipal water supply in their neighborhood (e.g., perhaps because they prefer their existing private borehole well, because of affordability considerations, etc.), as well as (b) households in neighborhoods that lack the option of household-level connections but are served by community water kiosks connected to the municipal supply.
  • 29. To contextualize these statistics on non-revenue water (NRW): Using performance data from the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET, at, the World Bank reported that NRW averages around 35 percent for developing countries. However, underreporting and geographic coverage gaps in the IBNET database led the authors to estimate that the true overall NRW level for the developing world is closer to 40-50 percent. The report further suggested that cutting these losses in half is an attainable target; the best-performing developing world utilities achieve NRW levels below 25 percent. See Kingdom, B.; Roland, L.; and P. Marin. (2006) The challenge of reducing non-revenue water (NRW) in developing countries – how the private sector can help: a look at performance-based service contracting. Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board discussion paper no. 8. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. According to the Water Supply Investment Master Plan referenced in footnote 26, the Zambian independent utility regulator (NWASCO) considers NRW levels above 25 percent to be “unacceptable,” 20-25 percent to be “acceptable,” and below 20 percent to be “good.”
  • 30. A “just-in-time redesign” is a last-minute change where technical details are adjusted shortly before construction begins. Ideally, plans and engineering designs are developed ahead of time, to allow for optimum planning, efficiency, and coordination of various project components.
  • 31. Resettlement refers both to physical displacement (relocation or loss of shelter) and to economic displacement (loss of assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or other means of livelihood) as a result of project-related land acquisition or restrictions on land use. It can be either permanent or temporary depending on the circumstances. Resettlement is considered involuntary when affected persons or communities do not have the right to refuse land acquisition or restrictions on land use that result in physical or economic displacement. This occurs in cases of (i) lawful expropriation or temporary or permanent restrictions on land use and (ii) negotiated settlements in which the buyer can resort to expropriation or impose legal restrictions on land use if negotiations with the seller fail. See International Finance Corporation. (2012). Performance Standard 5 Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement, retrievable from:
  • 32. A project-affected person (“PAP”) is an individual or a family (household) that loses a home, land, or business interests because of project-required land acquisition. Any given resettlement impact could affect one or more people depending on whether it is registered for an individual, a household, a business, or other entity (such as a church or other organization).
  • 33. Throughout the livelihood restoration process, gender expertise and targeted support were extended to mitigate the particular risks that female project-affected people faced retaining control of their compensation within their households and investing in new opportunities.
  • 34. The 30 percent target was drawn from a Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol. That protocol is now outdated. However many countries use 30 percent as a target for women’s representation in politics, and a number of companies have followed suit for board and executive level representation.
  • 35. World Economic Forum, 2016. The Future of Jobs, Table 14.
  • 36. A borehole well is a narrow shaft drilled vertically into the ground. It allows for pumping (extraction) and/or sampling of groundwater.
  • 37. Water Supply Investment Master Plan: Investment Strategy Report, Jan 2011.
  • 38. The compact did not fund private plumbing. Property owners had to cover the expense of installing any necessary pipes and hardware to connect their building with the new water pipes at their plot, as well as paying the utility’s water connection fees.
  • 39. As mentioned in the context of water connections, the compact did not fund private plumbing. This policy also applied to sewer connections. Property owners had to cover the expense of installing toilets, water closets, and any necessary pipes and hardware to connect their building with the new sewer line at their plot, as well as paying the utility’s sewerage connection fees.  Through the Innovation Grant Program (see the Institutional Strengthening section, below), the compact did support the creation of a small revolving loan fund to help finance household connections to the sanitation network.
  • 40. After the new sewage treatment plan comes online, it is expected that Kaunda Square will provide additional treatment capacity for heavy flows during the wet season.
  • 41. In Lusaka, especially in the peri-urban areas, the toilet is often installed in a small outbuilding constructed for the purpose. Unless the toilet uses pour-flush, a water connection is necessary. In peri-urban areas that never had water or sewer lines before the compact, households required both water and sewer connection fees at the same time.
  • 42. These figures were calculated through compact-funded studies.
  • 43. The Public Health Act prohibits pit latrines and septic tanks within 200 feet of a sewer line. Residents must therefore connect to the sewer line.
  • 44. After one year with one of two planned trash traps in place, it became clear that LCC was not yet able to manage the operation of trash traps of this design. Rather than installing the second trash trap (of the same design, intended to work in concert with the first one to improve the environmental performance of the drainage system), the first trash trap was removed and the materials placed in storage. LCC will install both traps when they are prepared to manage them. The operationalization of an autonomous solid waste management company (discussed in the Assistance to Lusaka City Council subsection, below) is expected to reduce the trash load, which should make it easier for LCC to operate and maintain the trash traps.
  • 45. The drainage works were not fully completed due to performance problems with the contractor, which had significant cash flow problems and filed for protection from creditors in December 2018.
  • 46. Total length of transmission lines constructed and rehabilitated. This indicator is tied to strengthening Water Supply.
  • 47. Total number of connections with operating meter/ total number of connections, expressed in percentage
  • 48. In year four of compact implementation, after works were underway, consultants used billing and system input data from LWSC to estimate the total baseline NRW at 56.8 percent. In the same analysis, it was estimated that the total NRW could be reduced to 41.3 percent by the end of the project, suggesting that the original target of 34 percent may have been overly ambitious.
  • 49. This indicator includes estimates total quarterly water production from the Iolanda water treatment plant (40% production) and the 120+ boreholes around Lusaka (60% production). The indicator is also reported on by LWSC and per the data quality review this indicator is estimated because there are no bulk water meters at Iolanda or at most boreholes.
  • 50. A negative completion rate requires some explanation. The compact sought to increase water produced from 23.09 million cubic meters per quarter to 24.63 million cubic meters per quarter, an increase of 1.54 million cubic meters. However, water production at compact close sat at 18.85 million cubic meters, a decrease of 4.24 million cubic meters compared to the baseline.  Dividing the actual decrease (-4.24) by the targeted increase (1.54) and converting to percent generates a completion rate of -274 percent. 
  • 51. This indicator is reported by LWSC on a quarterly basis and has fluctuated throughout the compact. It is an average for all districts of Lusaka; the number of hours of water supply can vary dramatically by neighborhood and due to inconsistent availability of electricity (e.g., load shedding during the dry season) affects the continuity of service, but no data are available on the frequency and duration of power outages at baseline or over the course of the compact, so their impact on the performance measured by this indicator is unknown.
  • 52. A negative completion rate requires some explanation. The compact sought to increase the city-wide average availability of water service by 4 hours daily, from 18 to 22 hours per day. However, water service stood at 17 hours per day at compact close, a decrease of 1 hour daily.  Dividing the actual decrease (-1) by the targeted increase (4) and converting to percent yields a completion rate of -25 percent.
  • 53. Total number of new water supply connections in the project area. These are household connections and do not include kiosk connections. This indicator is a subset of Meters installed/replaced and should not be aggregated up for reporting
  • 54. The target should have been revised to reflect rescoping early in the compact, reflecting that the work was completed. However, the erroneous target cannot now be retroactively corrected due to internal policy for transparency and accountability.
  • 55. The drainage works were not fully completed due to performance problems with the contractor, which had significant cash flow problems and filed for protection from creditors in December 2018.
  • 56. Cogswell, Lynne. 2008. Development of Sanitation Marketing Strategy and Hygiene Promotion Program for Peri-Urban Settlements of Lusaka, Zambia. Market Analysis report prepared for the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program / Africa Ministry of Local Government and Housing, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company. The definition of “extreme poverty” used here was defined by Zambia’s Central Statistics Office in 2003 using local currency: K32,861 per month per adult (equivalent to $7/month per adult in 2003 dollars).
  • 57. In rotational staffing, employees are reassigned or “rotated” to a new position every few years. In organizations like the civil service with staffing needs across a wide geography, these rotations often involve a move from one city or region to another. Assignments typically have different job specifications and build flexibility rather than specialization or a linear progression of skills.
  • 58. It was not possible to estimate the relative proportion of physical and commercial losses when targets for non-revenue water (NRW) reduction were set early in the compact. As reported above under the explanation of results for the Infrastructure Activity, the final overall NRW reduction fell short of the target due to combination of implementation challenges and data quality issues.
  • 59. The National Water and Sanitation Council (NWASCO) is the independent utility regulator.
  • 60. Including the $11 million paid to clear arrears that were outstanding at the start of the compact, as required by a condition precedent.
  • 61. The outstanding arrears at the end of the compact reflected unpaid arrears identified in the last internal audit in October of 2017. The Government’s dependence on audits to trigger arears payments and comply with the ongoing condition precendent was the driver behind the move to legally empower LWSC to collect arrears directly.
  • 62. This assessment considered capacity for operations, maintenance, and capital improvement.
  • 63. Drainage Investment Plan for Priority Areas in Lusaka, Zambia, 2011, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
  • 64. A compact-funded Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report from May 2015 indicated that the total population in this area was 188,000 people.
  • 65. Bio-latrines are latrines connected to a biogas digester. The design minimizes blockage risks and the challenges of emptying the pit under the latrine, while providing primary treatment for sanitary waste and producing biogas that can be sold to nearby street vendors and businesses.
  • 66. Total annual operational revenues divided by total annual operating costs. This indicator helps assess the financial health and stability of the utility.
  • 67. Ultimately this contribution was paid by the Ministry of Finance due to budget constraints by LCC. As previously mentioned this condition was revised to also provide for solid waste management expenses in addition to drainage maintenance and repair given the decoupling of solid waste management from the LCC and establishment of a new Solid Waste Management Company.
  • 68. In neighborhoods that do not yet have sewer lines, suitably designed on-site sanitation options exist that can replace unlined pit latrines.
  • 69. Since groundwater is an unseen resource, it is harder to measure and easier to over-exploit than surface water. But if an accurate estimate of the natural recharge rate is available and the political will is there, it’s possible to balance withdrawals against recharge so as to avoid depleting the aquifer and compromising the future viability of the groundwater supply.
  • 70. Provided that LWSC maintains effective chlorination of the treated water supply, as enabled by MCC investments, there will be a measure of protection against microbial contamination of the groundwater. However, LWSC is unable to treat for nitrate contamination, which also comes from pit latrines. Prevention is the best option, and in the case of Lusaka this would entail eliminating unlined pit latrines and digging out decommissioned ones to remove the human waste that is the nitrate source.
  • 71. In February 2012, an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) noted elevated levels of nitrate in the groundwater from several borehole wells that are part of LWSC’s supply network. These wells also had microbiological contamination. The ESIA concluded that the nitrate source was pollution from pit latrines and other waste disposal activities. Due to coordination shortcomings at MCC, awareness of potential nitrate contamination challenges was lost until 2017 when an external evaluator, CDC, reported that they had measured elevated levels of nitrate in water supplied by LWSC to some areas of the city.