Sector Results and Learning:
Agriculture and Irrigation

The randomized roll-out evaluation approach has risks. In a randomized roll-out approach, a first round of treatment farmers is compared to a control group of farmers that receive training at a later date. The key to this approach is that there be enough time between the two phases to see behavior change and the accrual of benefits for the first farmers before the second round of farmers is trained. Timelines for farmer adoption of new practices, the five-year compact timeline and inevitable implementation delays can make a randomized roll-out a very risky approach. In the case of Ghana, the randomized roll-out resulted in training the control group before the end of the compact, allowing only one crop cycle between the first treatment and the incorporation of the controls. Given the loss of the counterfactual, it is not possible to estimate the causal impact of the training on outcomes with additional crop cycles.

Better water monitoring tools could help Water User Associations while also providing better measurement of outcomes. Improved water delivery and reduced losses were fundamental expected outcomes of the Irrigation Infrastructure Activity, but the existing data have not been validated, and there are not accurate measures of water delivery to farmers. This makes it difficult to know whether water availability has actually improved for individual farmers. Creating the means for WUAs to more precisely measure water delivery would also potentially help them manage their resources more effectively.

Reliance on other donors for sustainability increases project risk and requires committed partners along with active engagement before and during implementation. MCC intended for USAID and other donors to conduct farmer training and follow-up activities in the IWRM Project areas. However, it is unclear if these activities occurred as initially anticipated. Given the importance of this in the program logic, the activities should have either been built into the project (preferred) or anchored more securely with another donor. A preferred approach would be to build off an already successful donor project, if possible.

Programs should have an evidence-based theory for the extent of behavior change necessary to achieve intended outcomes and be implemented in a way likely to foster that change. One notable success of CBRLM is that it resulted in substantial adoption of key practices, many of which were sustained two years after the program ended. However, these new practices did not translate into the material outcomes anticipated in the program’s theory of change. The evaluation measured the nature and intensity of behavior change and found imperfect adoption, including a lack of coordination across farmers in a community, and individual farmers failing to implement all key behaviors, or to implement them throughout the day, throughout the year, or rigorously enough. The evaluation noted that the three-year implementation period may have been too ambitious for this kind of program, and the number and geographic distribution of participating communities made it difficult for facilitators to spend significant time in each one. Perhaps individual or community compliance would have been higher with more intensive implementation, though it is also possible that CBRLM methods were not suitable to bring about the desired changes in this environment or timeframe. Future programs should be aware of such complexities and be clear and realistic about (i) the type of behavior change sought; (ii) the quality of evidence supporting that behavior change; (iii) why the behaviors should be appropriate for the context; (iv) how the program might need to adapt given cultural or ecological variation; and (v) the duration or intensity of assistance required to bring about the targeted change.

Expectations of Beneficiaries: At several locations the intended beneficiaries are not yet using the improved facilities constructed by the Project. There was insufficient space at both Agadir and Mohammedia to construct enough lockers to accommodate all the boats registered at these ports. The cooperatives responsible for allocating these facilities have been reluctant or unwilling to do so. This is difficult for outsiders – MCC, MCA Morocco and Morocco’s National Fisheries Office (ONP) – to understand given that the cooperatives were well aware of the situation prior to the start of construction. In retrospect it appears that the Project did less than it should have to help the cooperatives at each location make acceptable allocation and rationing decisions and to manage the expectations of their members. Thus far ONP has been unable to resolve these problems during the Post-Compact period.